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The Problem of Knowledge Acquisition
Abstract
This paper outlines an approach to the problem of knowledge
acquisition. We argue that knowledge acquisition can be
conceptualized as the articulation and restructuring of
generative theory-like structures which we call schemata. We
propose that the domain of observational astronomy is a
particularly promising content domain for studying knowledge
restructuring. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of
these ideas for instruction.
The Problem of Knowledge Acquisition
The purpose of this paper is to review some of the
literature that deals with the problem of how new knowledge is
acquired, and to outline our own theoretical approach to this
topic. Our position is that knowledge is organized in global
conceptual constructs which we call schemata, and that the
process of knowledge acquisition can be conceptualized as the
articulation and restructuring of these schemata. We suggest
that the domain of observational astronomy (i.e., the knowledge
about the sun, moon, and stars in relation to the earth) would be
an appropriate domain to test these ideas. Finally, we sketch
some of the implications of our theoretical framework for
instruction.
Knowledge Restructuring
In the Meno, Plato raises the fundamental question of how it
is possible to acquire new knowledge. He puts the issue in the
form of a dilemma: either one already knows what one is trying
to learn, in which case there is no reason to learn anything; or
one does not, in which case one will not know when he or she has
been successful in the attempt. While Plato's formulation of the
problem may be a bit too extreme, it does serve the purpose of
raising the question of how it is possible to acquire new
knowledge from experience, a question which has occupied
philosophers and psychologists ever since (see Hamlyn, 1978; and
Petrie, 1981, for recent philosophical treatments of this issue).
The Problem of Knowledge Acquisition
The Problem of Knowledge Acquisition
While some learning may consist of the acquisition of
"totally" new knowledge (e.g., Campbell, 1974; Petrie, 1981),
most of the learning that occurs in life is either assimilated to
or accommodates (to use Piaget's terms) prior knowledge. Indeed,
the acquisition of new knowledge from experience makes little
sense without assuming that there exists some prior knowledge
within which the new experience is interpreted. Otherwise the
new experience will be unintelligible. There is now a
substantial body of psychological literature that demonstrates
the importance of prior knowledge in learning (see Bransford,
1981, for a review).
In an important paper on the topic of learning, Rumelhart
and Norman (1981a) distinguish three possible ways in which
existing knowledge can be modified by new experience:
accretion, tuning, and restructuring. Accretion refers to the
gradual accumulation of factual information. Tuning refers to
the evolutionary change in the categories we use for interpreting
information. These evolutionary changes are the result of a
number of different processes. They may involve generalizing or
constraining the extent of a concept's applicability, determining
its default values, or otherwise improving the accuracy of the
concept so that it best fits the actual data. The third type of
learning is restructuring. Restructuring refers to the creation
of new structures which are devised either to re-interpret old
information or to account for new information. Restructuring
represents the most radical form of knowledge acquisition within
a prior-knowledge framework. This type of process is frequently
postulated by investigators attempting to account for the radical
changes in knowledge that appear to occur with age or with
expertise. In the work of Piaget, for instance, developmental
change is attributed to global restructurings known as stages.
For Piaget, restructuring is conceptualized as a change in
the very structures that determine the nature of the
representational format available to the child. These changes
are brought about by the growth of the child's logical
capabilities. Thus the child's ability for representational
thinking marks the difference between sensori-motor and
preoperational and operational structures. This type of
restructuring is said to constrain children's ability to acquire
knowledge in all domains and thus has been referred to as global
restructuring (Carey, in press).
Piaget's theory of global restructuring has been criticized
on the grounds that it is not supported by the available evidence
(Carey, 1980; Gelman & Baillergeon, 1983; Mandler, 1983).
Recently, Carey (in press) has suggested that it could be
replaced by what she refers to as domain-specific restructuring.
Carey argues that developmental change can be viewed as domain-
specific theory change. According to this view, children begin
with a few theory-like conceptual structures (i.e., a naive
psychology and a naive physics) which, through differentiation,
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develop to others (i.e., biology, a theory of mechanics, a theory
of heat, etc.).
The domain-specific view of restructuring has emerged out of
the study of the differences between novices and experts in
various domains of human expertise such as physics (Chi, Glaser,
& Rees, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon & Simon, 1981; McCloskey,
Caramazza & Green, 1980; Clement, 1983), chess (Chase & Simon,
1973a, 1973b), radiology (Lesgold, Feltovitch, Glaser, & Wang,
1981), and the social sciences (Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner,
1983) among others. This research has produced two different
interpretations of the kind of restructuring that can occur with
knowledge acquisition.
Some researchers investigating the novice/expert shift
(e.g., Chi, Glaser & Rees, 1982; Larkin, 1979, 1981) have argued
that the knowledge representations of expert physicists are
different from those of novices both in terms of their content
(i.e., a greater amount of more abstract information), and in
terms of their structure (i.e., what could be characterized as a
basic category for the expert is a superordinate category for the
novice, Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981, and Chi et al., 1982).
These researchers appear to view the knowledge acquisition
press) on the acquisition of expertise in the social sciences.
This position has been referred to as the "weak" restructuring
position, as contrasted to the "radical" restructuring view of
the novice/expert shift, which is represented in the work of
Disessa (1982), McCloskey (1983), Wiser and Carey (1983), among
others. According to this latter view, the novice/expert shift
involves a change in theory, similar in many respects to the kind
of theory change observed in the history of science (Hanson,
1958; Kuhn, 1957, 1962).
According to the radical restructuring position, the novice
does not simply have an impoverished theory as compared to the
expert; the novice has a different theory, different in terms of
its structure, different in the domain of phenomena it explains,
and different in its individual concepts. Many researchers who
hold the radical restructuring position point to correspondences
between theory changes in the history of science and changes in
an individual's theories as the individual acquires knowledge
in a domain. These correspondences raise interesting questions
about the extent to which ontogeny may recapitulate phylogeny.
Thus, Disessa (1982) and White (1983) seem to be making the claim
that novices in physics hold theories which resemble more those
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Views that incorporate a process of radical restructuring of
domain-specific knowledge have been recently proposed by a number
of researchers working in the area of science education (e.g.,
Driver & Easley, 1978; Fensham, 1983; Novak, 1977a, 1976; Osborne
& Wittrock, 1983; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). For
example, Novak (1977a) argued that it was time for a shift in
views regarding cognitive development, from a stage dependent
view to a view that cognitive development is dependent "on the
framework of specific concepts and integrations between these
concepts acquired during the active life span of the individual"
(p. 473). Driver and Easley (1978) in review of the literature
on concept development in science criticize Piaget's notion of
global restructuring but encourage educators to view Piaget's
accounts of children's thinking in various content areas as
important sources of information about children's alternate
conceptual frameworks, "some of which reflect analogies with
historically held views" (p. 80), that children bring to the
science learning task. Furthermore, it is usually recognized in
these writings, that the process of conceptual change involves
not the simple addition of information to an existing but
underdeveloped conceptual structure, but, rather, the formation
of new conceptual models (something that Wittrock, 1981, and
Osborne & Wittrock, 1983, call "generative learning").
Mechanisms for Knowledge Restructuring
So far, most of the work that has been done in the area of
knowledge acquisition is of a descriptive nature. Little or
nothing has been said about the mechanisms thereby which these
changes are brought about. Some discussion about mechanisms can
be found in the work of Rumelhart (Rumelhart & Norman, 1981a,
1981b; and Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977), in the work from the area
of Artificial Intelligence, (e.g., Carbonell, 1983; Langley,
Zytkow, Simon & Bradshaw, 1983; Larkin, 1981; Winston, 1981,
1983) and in the work on the instructional implications of
cognitive science (e.g., Anderson, 1977; Champagne, Klopfer,
Gunstone, 1982; Greeno, 1980).
One major mechanism for restructuring is learning by
analogies (metaphors or models). In learning by analogy the
restructured schema is patterned on an existing schema from a
different domain with the necessary modifications. Analogy has
been found to be a potent mechanism for schema acquisition in the
area of artificial intelligence (e.g., Burstein, 1983; Carbonell,
1983; Schank, 1982; Winston, 1981), and in studies of how
scientists solve problems (Clement, 1982; Darden, 1983;
Oppenheimer, 1956). Experimental work has shown that the use of
explicit analogies facilitates learning in a new domain in adults
(Gentner, 1981; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Rumelhart & Norman,
1981b) and in children (Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983; Vosniadou &
Schommer, in preparation).
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Other possible mechanisms for restructuring that have been
discussed in the literature are schema induction, which involves
the discovery of the regularities in the co-occurrences of
certain phenomena (Rumelhart & Norman, 1981b), generalization and
specialization (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) and Socratic dialogues
(Anderson, 1977; Champagne, Klopfer & Gunstone, 1982; Collins,
1977). However, it seems to us that schema induction,
generalization, and specialization describe the product of a
change which involves restructuring, but do not describe the
mechanisms thereby which this change is achieved. Socratic
dialogues are also mechanisms for restructuring only to the
extent that they facilitate the awareness of inconsistencies
which motivate the search for a new schema. They do not
describe how the new schema itself is acquired.
Our Theoretical Position
Our position has many similarities with the radical
restructuring view. A basic tenet of our position is that
knowledge is organized in schemata, and that schemata are
theoretical entities that describe "the mental structures and
processes underlying the molar aspects of human knowledge"
(Brewer & Nakamura, 1984, p. 42). A major defining
characteristic of schemata is what Brewer and Nakamura (1984)
refer to as the "molar assumption." The "molar assumption" is
the assumption that the theory of human cognition cannot be an
atomistic theory which postulates that the more complex aspects
of human activity can always be derived from combinations of
basic mental elements, but that one frequently needs to postulate
larger theoretical entities which operate as units in the theory
(see also Anderson, 1980; Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony,
1977).
A second assumption is that a schema, like a scientific
theory, is a generative structure; generative in the sense that
it can be used as a mechanism for understanding new phenomena and
for predicting things that are not known. For example, a
cosmological schema which places the earth at the center of the
solar system has a wide range of implications which go beyond the
particular facts that a child has been taught.
Thirdly, it is assumed that the process of knowledge acquisition
can be characterized as one that involves both the articulation
and the restructuring of a schema. What we mean by "articulation
of a schema" is analogous in many respects to what Rumelhart and
Norman (1981) call "tuning," with what Kuhn (1970) calls "the
articulation of a theory," and with the "weak restructuring" view
of the novice/expert shift. Assuming that a schema is a
generative structure with implications beyond what is immediately
known, the working out of these implications is the kind of
learning which we refer to as the articulation of the schema. On
the other hand, restructuring is the kind of learning that
involves fundamental changes in the nature of the schema itself,
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changes similar to those referred to as "radical restructuring"
in the novice/expert literature.
The distinction between schema articulation and
restructuring is similar in many respects to the distinction
drawn by Kuhn regarding theory change as compared to change in
paradigms. According to Kuhn (1970), the exercise of "normal
science" consists mostly in the articulation of the existing
paradigms which may result in theory changes. Only when these
attempts at articulation fail repeatedly does the motivation for
a paradigm shift arises. Paradigm shifts happen in an effort to
resolve the anomalies that exist in the relation of existing
theory to nature (Kuhn, 1970, p. 97).
The process of developmental change can be seen in similar
terms, namely as a process which consists mainly in the
articulation of existing schemata. Occasionally the child is
faced with major anomalies an existing schema cannot account for
and restructuring is required. Seeing the child as a scientist
can be useful in the present framework (see also Carey & Block,
1976, Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1975) for it provides a way to
reconcile the kind of learning which consists mainly in the
elaboration of existing structures as compared to the more
radical restructurings.
However, there are also important differences between
children and scientists which have to be considered. For
example, while restructuring in the case of the scientist
requires the creation of an internally consistent new paradigm,
this is not usually the case in the child. Unlike the scientist,
the problem for the developing child is that of integrating
current scientific views (from the adult world) with the child's
phenomenal experience. Children's misconceptions often reflect
quite clearly these attempts at integration. For example, the
information that the earth is round is interpreted by elementary
school children whose phenomenal experience is that of a flat
earth to mean that the earth is flat with a circular shape, or
that there is another earth somewhere in the sky that is a round
sphere (see Nussbaum & Novak, 1976).
Knowledge Acquisition in the Domain of Astronomy
We are now in the process of testing our theoretical views
in a project that deals with children's acquisition of knowledge
in the domain of astronomy, or more specifically, that of
planetary mechanics. The question of interest is how children
acquire knowledge about the size, shape, distance and motion of
the sun, the moon and the stars in relation to the earth and how
this knowledge changes with age. The domain of astronomy was
selected because it is one of the few knowledge domains that met
a set of criteria which we believe are necessary to test our
theoretical position. First, it is based on information which
is, for the most part, accessible to the child. The child's
knowledge of the everyday world already contains many of the
phenomena which are explained by theories of the solar system and
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its motion (e.g., the day/night cycle; the changing seasons; the
phases of the moon). In addition, it is a conceptually rich
domain which has undergone major theoretical restructurings in
its historical development. The successive theories in the area
of planetary mechanics have been taken to be classic examples of
revolutions in the history of science (e.g., Kuhn, 1957, 1970).
One of the basic issues we are interested in studying is the
nature of schema restructuring, and it appears that by choosing a
knowledge domain in which the scientists have undergone major
paradigm shifts would maximize our chances of finding similar
shifts on the part of the children acquiring the domain.
We believe that it is possible to identify a limited set of
generative schemata which will characterize children's knowledge
of planetary mechanics at different ages although a great deal of
individual variation within the same age range is also expected.
It is hypothesized that the first schemata will be based mainly
on the phenomenal appearance of the everyday world and that the
later ones will be more and more influenced by adult scientific
theories. While it is not possible to give a full account of
these schemata without comprehensive data, tentative hypotheses
can, nevertheless, be suggested on the basis of the available
developmental evidence and on the basis of the theories that have
been held in the history of astronomy.
We think that young children will adopt the "common sense"
view that the earth is flat and motionless, and that gravity
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operates along an up/down gradient. This has been called the
"Flat Earth Animistic Schema." A series of recent studies in the
area of science education (Nussbaum, 1979; Nussbaum & Novack,
1976; Sneider & Pulos, 1983) have argued that children around
ages 6-8 believe the earth is flat. Almost all children at this
age say the earth is round when asked, but under more detailed
questioning ("Where does the sun go at night?"; "What does the
earth look like when you look at it from very far away?") give
answers consistent with a flat earth view.
At this time children will also adopt a stationary
geocentric view of the sun-earth relation and will provide
animistic accounts of the apparent motion of the moon and the
sun. Piaget's (1929, 1930) studies of the young child's
conceptions of the physical world suggest that the young child
frequently provides animistic explanations of the motion of the
sun and moon. Piaget proposes that often young children (ages
4-5) assume that inanimate objects that move possess human
attributes. Thus, children say "yes" to questions such as,
"Could the sun stop shining if it wanted to?" (Piaget, 1929, p.
226) or "Is the sun alive?" (Piaget, 1930, p. 82). Later in
development children shift to a mechanistic account of
astronomical phenomena. For example, they say that the moon
moves because "It is pushed by the wind" (Haupt, 1950, p. 226),
that at night "It's the air which becomes black" (Piaget, 1929;
p. 293), and that the phases of the moon are caused by clouds
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which "cover the moon and make it different shapes" (Haupt, 1948,
p. 259).
The change from the animistic to the mechanistic account of
celestial phenomena represents the first major restructuring in
the children's knowledge of astronomy. This second schema has
been called "The Flat Earth Mechanistic Schema." This schema
combines the view of a motionless, flat earth with a geocentric
but mechanistic account of the celestial phenomena. Thus, at the
time when children hold this schema they might give an
explanation of the day-night cycle by claiming that the sun moves
under the ground during the night, or explain the phases of the
moon by saying that clouds cover part of it.
It is hypothesized that the next major restructuring will
involve a change from a flat earth to a round earth position and
that the concept of a round earth will not be fully understood
until children know that gravity operates toward the center of a
spherical earth. The studies of Nussbaum (1979) and Nussbaum and
Novack (1976) show that children shift from a view that gravity
operates along an up/down gradient (i.e., things fall from high
places to low places) to a position that gravity operates toward
the center of large objects such as the earth. Thus children
with the first view argue that if there were people on the other
side of the earth they would fall off, whereas older children say
that they would not. We call this the "Round Earth Stationary
Geocentric Schema" because it also assumes that the children have
The Problem of Knowledge Acquisition
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a geocentric view of the earth-sun relation (they assume that the
sun rotates around the earth).
The geocentric view is again more consistent with the
phenomenal evidence. The Copernican shift and the adoption of
heliocentric view, we predict, will not come until much later on.
There is currently little explicit developmental data on this
shift but clearly this is a plausible sequence of knowledge
acquisition. In fact, Piaget (1930) argues that the heliocentric
view is so far removed from children's conceptualization of the
earth-sun relation that it would be quite fruitless to attempt to
teach young children this view (p. 85). We call this last schema
the "Heliocentric Round Earth Schema."
These schemata are considered generative because they can be
used to explain phenomena or to predict things currently not
known. For example, children with a flat earth animistic schema
will tend to explain the day/night cycle in terms of the sun's
voluntary movement (the sun was tired and went to bed, or hid
behind the moon, etc.), even though they (hopefully) never heard
similar explanations of the day/night cycle from adults.
Conversely, children with a round earth geocentric schema will
tend to explain the day/night cycle in terms of the movement of
the sun around the earth, again despite the fact that they were
not given such explanations by their parents or teachers.
In this framework, schema articulation can be conceptualized
as the kind of learning which is consistent with the implications
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of the current schema, but extends and enriches that schema. For
example, even some adults with a heliocentric schema do not know
how to explain how the seasons work or what causes the phases of
the moon. The acquisition of this type of knowledge would
certainly enrich their heliocentric schema without requiring any
restructuring.
Following Kuhn (1970), Carey (in press) and Wiser and Carey
(1983), we have focused on three criteria for distinguishing the
radical restructuring of a previous schema. That the two schemata
should be different in terms of (a) the domain of phenomena they
explain, (b) their structure, and (c) their individual concepts.,
All the restructurings we have described meet these three
criteria. For example, the shift from an animistic to a
mechanistic explanation of the movement of the sun and the moon
can be conceptualized as representing the separation of astronomy
from a psychological schema, similar to the separation of biology
from a psychological schema, described by Carey (in press).
Clearly, the explanatory framework for phenomena such as the
day/night cycle is completely different in an animistic cosmology
than a mechanistic one. Moreover, the relationship between the
movement of the celestial objects and phenomena such as the
day/night cycle cannot be understood in the context of animistic
causality.
The shift from an animistic to a mechanistic causality also
represents a change in the structure of the domain. In an
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animistic framework astronomical phenomena are one part of the
larger psychological theory that children have developed on the
basis of their experiences. What children know about these
phenomena is information such as that they go to sleep during the
night, that they wake up during the day, that the sun is in the
sky during the day and so on. When children start providing
mechanistic accounts of astronomical phenomena we have evidence
that a new schema has been formed, a schema with its own
structure and explanatory domain. Finally, this shift brings
about changes in individual concepts. The concept of an
animistic sun, a sun who goes to bed at night, or who disappears
behind the mountains so that we can go to sleep, is clearly
different from the concept of a mechanistic sun.
Implications for Instruction
The relation of old knowledge and new knowledge. One of the
major results of recent work in cognitive science has been an
awareness of the importance of old knowledge in the acquisition
of new knowledge (Anderson, Spiro, & Montague, 1977; Bransford,
1981). Clearly, to the degree that is possible one wants to
elaborate old schemata and to construct new schemata out of old
ones. The process of learning is one of constantly relating
incoming information to what is already known, and of actively
testing hypotheses generated by one's current schemata. One
implication of this for instruction is that one needs a careful
description of the child's present knowledge in order to know how
The Problem of Knowledge Acquisition
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to relate new information to this base. Yet, most adults do not
take into consideration children's existing knowledge when trying
to teach them something new. For example, in most elementary
science programs the heliocentric model is assumed when teaching
children about astronomy, without consideration that the child
may be operating from a very different knowledge base. It seems
likely that teaching and instructional programs could be
considerably improved if we had a deeper understanding of
children's existing knowledge base.
The use of old knowledge to support new knowledge appears to
operate differently in the case of schema articulation than it
does in schema restructuring. Clearly, the relations of prior
knowledge to new one is important for schema articulation. One
cannot enrich and elaborate existing structures without first
identifying them. Correspondingly, when the purpose of
instruction is to promote the kind of learning that we have
described as schema articulation it is important to build the
instruction around the child's existing schema. However, it is
not clear how important domain-specific knowledge is when it
comes to schema restructuring. This problem is particularly
acute in the domain of astronomy, a domain which is characterized
by a number of radical shifts of view. There has been much debate
in recent philosophy of science on this topic as it relates to
the historical development of scientific theories. Thus, Kuhn
(1962) initially argued that new scientific theories did not tend
The Problem of Knowledge Acquisition
21
to incorporate or be built on the basis of earlier theories, but
involved a completely new way of construing the world. In his
later work, Kuhn (1970, 1977) moderated his position somewhat and
suggested that to some extent one can see new theories as
building on the results of earlier ones.
This suggests that it may be profitable to identify which
aspects the earlier schema are compatible with the new schema and
to use this information during the acquisition process. Another
important question this discussion raises is that of the
sequencing of knowledge. Should children be taught the most
advanced schemata from the beginning, or not? For instance,
should young children be taught the heliocentric position from
the beginning, or should this view be delayed so that children
can work from a fully developed geocentric schema?
The recognition of anomaly. On the basis of study of the
history of science Kuhn (1962) has argued that the recognition of
anomalies that do not fit into the current paradigm is one of the
major motivating forces for radical conceptual shifts on the part
of scientists. Recently a number of researchers in the area of
developmental psychology (i.e., Kamiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1975),
and science education, have argued for the use of anomalies as a
mechanism to drive knowledge acquisition in science domains
(Anderson, 1977; Champagne, Klopfer, & Gunstone, 1982; Posner,
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982).
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We believe that the recognition of anomalies can serve an
important function in schema restructuring, but we question its
adequacy as the only mechanism for restructuring. While much
spontaneous restructuring may occur in development, it may not be
profitable to leave children alone to restructure their knowledge
of physics or astronomy, particularly when it is known what
theory the child must eventually develop. Here the child is in a
different situation than the scientist. The scientist who is
faced with an anomaly is forced into a re-examination of basic
assumptions without any guidance as to where this will lead.
However, it is not clear that this "pure discovery" method is the
optimal way for the child to acquire new knowledge. Clearly,
research is needed to study the impact of the recognition of
anomalies and of the "discovery method" on schema restructuring.
The use of analogies, metaphors and physical models. We
have argued that the mechanism of relating new knowledge to an
existing schema from the same domain may not be a good mechanism
for restructuring. However, one way old knowledge can be brought
to bear on the construction of a new schema is by using analogies
and metaphors from a different domain. Analogies can play
different roles in restructuring. They can facilitate both the
spontaneous discovery of a new schema, and the teaching of a new
schema to children or adults. In their efforts to understand the
anomalies that have forced them to seek a restructuring of a
domain scientists often notice an analogy to an already existing
schema. The spontaneous use of analogy is a powerful mechanism
for theory construction in the case of individual scientists (see
Darden & Maull, 1977; Gentner, 1980; Hesse, 1966; Oppenheimer,
1956) but very difficult to achieve in experimental situations
both with children (Vosniadou, 1984; Vosniadou, Brown &
Bernstein, in preparation), and in adults (Gick & Holyoak, 1980,
1983). Analogies can be very effective, however, when used for
the purpose of teaching a new schema. Both adults and children
can transfer information from a known domain to help schema
construction in a new area (Gentner, 1981; Vosniadou & Ortony,
1983; Vosniadou & Schommer, in preparation).
Physical models can often do the work of analogies when an
easily identifiable generative analogy is not present. Physical
models are particularly appropriate in a domain like that of
planetary mechanics in which the structure of the solar system
and its operation can be easily captured in a physical
representation. A schema can then be constructed by
internalizing this physical model, whose implications can then be
further elaborated.
Summary and Conclusions
We have argued that knowledge acquisition can be
conceptualized as the articulation and restructuring of
generative schemata. Assuming that a schema is a generative
structure with implications beyond what it is immediately known,
the working out of these implications is what we refer to as
23
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schema articulation. Schema restructuring is the kind of
learning that involves fundamental changes in the nature of the
schema itself, changes similar to those referred to as "radical
restructuring" in the novice/expert literature, or as "paradigm
shift" by Kuhn. We have argued that when the purpose of
instruction is to promote schema articulation it is very
important to build instruction around the child's already
existing schema. When the purpose of instruction is to promote
knowledge restructuring, it is important to foster recognition of
the anomalies in the existing schema. It is also important to
use explanatory analogies and/or physical models to bring
relevant knowledge from a different domain to help schema
restructuring. These theoretical ideas are currently being
tested in a research program that investigates the development of
knowledge in the domain of astronomy.
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